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Abstract
We study the optimal design of trade agreements in a setting where governments
can renegotiate the agreement ex-post subject to a key transaction cost, namely that
compensation between governments is ine¢ cient. The optimum may be a property-right
contract or a liabilitycontract. A property (liability) rule is optimal if uncertainty over
the joint political/economic benets from free trade is su¢ ciently small (high). Increasing
the bargaining power of the importing country favors property rules over liability rules.
And when we introduce a cost of renegotiation, we nd that property rules are more
likely to be optimal when this cost is higher, a result that reverses a central conclusion
of the law-and-economics literature. The model also delivers predictions on the pattern
of equilibrium renegotiation. If a property rule is optimal, it is never renegotiated. A
liability rule, on the other hand, will be renegotiated for intermediate states of the world.
And when renegotiation occurs, it always results in trade liberalization, not protection.
We thank Kyle Bagwell, Chad Bown, Vinicius Carrasco, Vitor Farinha-Luz, Gene Grossman, Petros C.
Mavroidis, Humberto Moreira, TN Srinivasan, Alan Sykes, participants in seminars at Chicago Booth, FGV-
Rio, PUC-Rio, Michigan, Stanford, UNC and the World Trade Organization, and participants in the 2009
NBER Summer Institute and the conferences The New Political Economy of Tradeat EUI (Florence), and
The Economics, Law and Politics of the GATT-WTOat Yale for very helpful comments. An earlier version of
this paper was circulated as Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements.Giovanni Maggi
thanks FGV-Rio for its hospitality during part of this project.
1. Introduction
When governments make international commitments, what is the optimal structure for their
contract? This question is at the heart of a growing debate among scholars of international trade
agreements. Broadly speaking, these commitments can take one of two possible contractual
forms. One type of contract assigns rights concerning trade policy to the contract parties.
To illustrate, consider a two-country world where the country that imports a good can either
practice free trade or engage in protection: this rst type of contract either assigns the right
to protect to the importing country, or it assigns the right of free trade to the exporting
country, and subsequently these rights can be transferred from one government to another only
through a voluntary transaction a renegotiation between the two governments. In e¤ect, this
type of contract assigns ownership of rights concerning trade policy, and as a consequence it is
commonly referred to in the legal literature as a property rule. This contrasts with a second type
of contract, where the importer has the option to practice free trade, or to engage in protection
and compensate the exporter with a certain amount of damages. In the legal literature, this
type of contract is referred to as a liability rule.1 As emphasized by many scholars, the choice
between these two contract forms is a central issue for the design of a trade agreement (see for
instance Jackson, 1997, Schwartz and Sykes, 2002, Lawrence, 2003 and Pauwelyn, 2008).2
Looking across the range of real-world trade agreements, there is evidence that both liability
rules and property rules are at work. For example, Pauwelyn (2008) argues that property rules
provide the defaultapproach in both the WTO (applying for example to the WTO prohibi-
tions against quantitative restrictions and export subsidies) and NAFTA, but for certain specic
issues a liability-rule approach has instead been taken. Clear examples of liability rules in the
GATT/WTO are the provisions for temporary and permanent escapes from negotiated tari¤
bindings in GATT Articles XIX and XXVIII, respectively, and the rules applying to action-
ableproduction subsidies in Part III of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
1Use of the property- and liability-rule terminology is less common outside of the law-and-economics literat-
ure, but the choice between these two types of contract is an important topic also in the economics literature on
optimal contract design. In that literature, a liability-rule contract is often referred to as an option contract,
and a property-rule contract is sometimes referred to as a noncontingent contract,or simply a property-right
contract (see for example Segal and Whinston, 2002).
2More broadly, the choice between liability and property rules relates to the question of the optimal degree
of exibility in a trade agreement. That question has been an important subject of debate in economics,
international law and political science, where particular emphasis has been given to the desirability of escape
clauses in trade agreements (see for example Bagwell and Staiger, 1990, Sykes, 1991, and Rosendor¤ and Milner,
2001).
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Measures.3 And in NAFTA (as well as in many bilateral investment treaties), investor pro-
tection against expropriation is set up as a liability rule. In addition to this variation across
issues, there is evidence that the contract forms featured in a given institution evolve over time.
For instance, there is broad agreement that in the early years, GATT operated as a system of
liability rules (see Jackson, 1969, p. 147, Schwartz and Sykes, 2002, and Lawrence, 2003, p.
29); however, many legal scholars argue that in more recent times the GATT/WTO has evolved
toward a property-rule system (see, for example, Jackson, 1997, Charnovitz, 2003, Pauwelyn,
2008 and Pelc, 2009). A key aim of our paper is to examine the tradeo¤s involved in the choice
between these two contractual forms.
The intuitive appeal of a liability rule is that it may help mitigate a key limitation of trade
agreements, namely, the incompleteness of the contract. If governments could write a complete
contingent contract, the e¢ cient outcome could be achieved without any need for a liability
rule. But if such a contract is not feasible, for example because some key contingencies (such
as the strength of political pressures) are not veriable, then a liability rule can facilitate the
e¢ cient adjustment of trade policy choices without the need to specify those contingencies in
the contract. The simple logic is that the damage payment set by a liability rule can help induce
the importer to internalize the externalities that it imposes on its trading partner(s) through its
trade policy choices. But a liability-rule approach has its limitations. One limitation that stands
out in the context of trade agreements is that international lump-sum transfers are generally
not available; rather, the payment of damages from one government to another is typically
accomplished by self-helpand takes the form of tari¤ retaliation, which is ine¢ cient.4 This
transaction cost (ine¢ cient transfers) gives rise to a nontrivial tradeo¤ between property-rule
and liability-rule approaches.5
3Other examples of liability rules in the GATT/WTO can be found in the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (Article XXI, which provides for the renegotiation of specic commitments in services trade), and
in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Article 31, which sets conditions
under which compulsory licenses may be issued). The non-violation nullication-or-impairment clause of the
GATT can also be interpreted along the lines of a liability rule, as it permits countries to in e¤ect escape their
market access commitments with changes in domestic policies and pay damages to injured parties as a remedy.
See Pauwelyn (2008, pp. 134-136) for further discussion.
4The empirical magnitude of this ine¢ ciency is arguably of rst-order importance, especially if compensation
takes the form of tari¤ retaliation. The ine¢ ciencies associated with the use of tari¤s have been quantied by
many studies. For example, in one well-cited attempt (Hufbauer and Elliott, 1994), the authors conclude that
U.S. consumers pay over six times the average annual compensation of manufacturing workers to preserve each
job savedby special U.S. import protection.
5An additional limitation of a liability-rule approach is that it requires veriability of the harm inicted by a
countrys trade policy on its trading partner(s), which in practice is likely to be very imperfect. This limitation
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When evaluating this tradeo¤, it is important to allow for the possibility of renegotiation,
both because of the empirical signicance of renegotiation in real-world trade agreements,6 and
because renegotiation changes substantially the nature of the tradeo¤between the two contract
forms. With renegotiation possible, the ex-ante contract does not determine the policy outcome
directly; rather, it denes the disagreement point for the ex-post renegotiation. If there were
no transaction costs, the Coase theorem would apply and the ex-ante contract would be irrel-
evant for the policy outcome. But in the presence of transaction costs, the disagreement point
can impact the policy outcome, and the ex-ante contract can then have important e¢ ciency
consequences even when, as in the GATT/WTO, there are ample possibilities for renegotiation.
In light of these considerations, it is surprising that virtually all existing models of trade
agreements abstract from renegotiation (with the few partial exceptions discussed below). Our
paper advances this literature by studying the optimal design of trade agreements in the pres-
ence of renegotiation. Our analysis applies to trade agreements generally, but we will pay
particular attention to the GATT/WTO, which is a natural institution on which to focus given
its prominence in the world trading system.
In recent years there has been considerable research more generally on the optimal design of
contracts in the presence of renegotiation, leading examples of which are the papers by Maskin
and Moore (1999), Segal and Whinston (2002) and Watson (2007). Our approach broadly
follows this literature, by considering an environment with nonveriable information where the
contract is designed ex-ante but can be renegotiated ex post through Nash bargaining. However,
we depart from this literature by introducing some new features that are motivated by the
international trade context, and we also impose some restrictions to make the model tractable.
The main feature we add is that government-to-government transfers involve a deadweight loss,
hence utility is nontransferable, whereas the typical models of contracting with renegotiation
focus on the case of transferable utility.7 The main restriction we introduce, on the other hand,
is that we focus on a binary policy choice. This buys us tractability, and as we later describe
this focus captures many trade-related policies that are discrete in practice.8 As a consequence
is often emphasized in the informal law-and-economics literature, and we discuss it briey in the Conclusion.
However, we abstract from it in our basic model in order to focus more sharply on the role of ine¢ cient transfers.
6See for example Hoda (2001) and Busch and Reinhardt (2006) for an account of the many instances in
which GATT/WTO members have engaged in renegotiation of their trade policy commitments.
7Maskin and Moore (1999) and Segal and Whinston (2002) are able to extend some results to the case of
nontransferable utility, but the sharpest ndings of this literature are all derived with transferable utility.
8A further restriction is that we focus on menu contracts, that is, contracts based on the choice of just one
player (in our case the importer). In principle, one could design a more sophisticated mechanism that is based
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of the structure we impose, our model delivers sharp results on the pattern of equilibrium
renegotiation and on the desirability of property rules versus liability rules.
More specically, we consider a two-country setting where governments contract over trade
policy in the presence of uncertainty about the joint benets of free trade, which could be
positive or negative, due for example to political economy factors. Contracts are perfectly
enforceable, but the joint benets of free trade are not veriable, so a complete contingent
contract cannot be written. The agreement can take the form of a property rule (that either
assigns the right of free trade to the exporter or assigns the right to protect to the importer),
or of a liability rule (which gives the importer a choice between free trade and protection-cum-
compensation). Importantly, we assume that transfers between governments are costly, so that
utility is not transferrable; and we allow governments to renegotiate their contract through
Nash bargaining once the state of the world is realized.
We start by observing that in our setting it may be optimal to induce renegotiation in equi-
librium, and indeed the model yields several predictions concerning the pattern and direction
of renegotiation. First, if the contract is designed optimally, renegotiation (when it occurs) will
result in trade liberalization, not protection. More specically, according to our model equilib-
rium renegotiations must take a particular form, in which the exporter agrees to compensate
the importer in exchange for trade liberalization, against the importers (credible) threat to
protect and pay damages.9 Second, while it might be expected that renegotiation would be
triggered in extreme states of the world, where the joint benets of free trade are either very
large and positive or very large and negative, we nd that in equilibrium renegotiation can only
occur for intermediate states of the world. Thus, at a broad level, in our model renegotiation
is not an extraordinaryevent, but rather occurs in ordinarycircumstances.
A third and key prediction concerning the pattern of renegotiation is that, if a property rule
is optimal, it is not renegotiated in equilibrium, and hence it entails no equilibrium transfers.
We discuss this nding in light of evidence that the use of compensation/tari¤-retaliation in
on messages sent by both players. But as Segal and Whinston (2002) explain, a (continuous) mechanism that
is based on two-sided messages may or may not improve upon a menu contract, depending on the contracting
environment. It is therefore an open question whether and to what extent more elaborate mechanisms can
improve upon menu contracts in our setting, though as a practical matter it should also be noted that in the
context of a policy that is applied on a continuing basis as in our setting, the high frequency with which such
message games would have to be played in response to potentially changing states of the world would likely
make them exceedingly costly to run. In any case, this is a question that we leave for future research.
9While we do not attempt an empirical assessment of our models predictions, we conrm below that this
form of renegotiation does indeed occur in the GATT/WTO.
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the GATT/WTO has diminished through time, and we suggest that this diminished role for
compensation may be a consequence of the shift from liability to property rules that, in the
view of GATT/WTO legal scholars as we have described above, has occurred over time.
We then examine whether the optimal contract takes the form of a property rule or a
liability rule. In the standard setting where parties cannot renegotiate the contract, the tradeo¤
between property rules and liability rules is conceptually simple: property rules involve no
ex-post transfers but imply inexible policy outcomes, while liability rules allow more policy
exibility but entail costly transfers. But the ability to renegotiate the contract ex-post changes
the nature of the tradeo¤ in signicant ways: rst, property rules no longer necessarily imply
inexible policy outcomes; and second, there is a new consideration that plays an important
role, namely how the rule specied in the contract a¤ects the amount of transfers that occur
when the contract is renegotiated. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that even though the tradeo¤
is more subtle, the predictions of the model are sharper when renegotiation is allowed.
We nd that a property rule is optimal if uncertainty about the joint benets of protection
is su¢ ciently low, whereas a liability rule is optimal when this uncertainty is high. Under
the interpretation that this uncertainty is caused primarily by political-economy shocks, our
nding suggests that the use of liability (property) rules should be more (less) prevalent for issue
areas that are more politicizedand hence prone to political-economy shocks. As we discuss
further below, this nding is suggestive of the pattern of liability and property rules observed
in the GATT/WTO, and is broadly in line with the emphasis that GATT negotiators placed
on uncertainty as they considered the potential benets of liability rules. Moreover we show
that, if a liability rule is optimal, the optimal level of damages falls short of fully compensating
the exporter, contrary to the e¢ cient breachargument in the law-and-economics literature
and in line with features of GATT/WTO remedies based on the principle of reciprocity.
One of the key parameters of the model is the relative bargaining power of the two govern-
ments. In our setting, bargaining powers have e¢ ciency consequences, not just distributional
consequences, because utility is not transferrable. We nd that increasing the bargaining power
of the importing country tends to favor property rules over liability rules. This follows from
the ine¢ ciency of transfers and the combination of two results we mentioned above: rst, if
the importer is stronger the equilibrium transfer is larger, because equilibrium renegotiations
always entail the exporter compensating the importer; and second, an optimal property rule is
never renegotiated in equilibrium and hence entails no equilibrium transfers.
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We also consider the impact of renegotiation frictions on the optimal form of contract. We
capture renegotiation frictions in a very simple way by introducing a xed cost of renegotiation.
We nd that increasing this cost favors property rules over liability rules. As we discuss further
below, this result contrasts sharply with a central conclusion of the law-and-economics literat-
ure, namely, that bargaining frictions tend to favor liability rules over property rules (Calabresi
and Melamed, 1972, and Kaplow and Shavell, 1996).10 Interestingly, if transfers were costless,
the e¤ect of introducing renegotiation frictions in our model would be reversed, that is, liab-
ility rules would be favored. This explains why our result diverges from the conclusion of the
law-and-economics literature: unlike that literature, we focus on a world with costly transfers,
which as we argued are a key transaction cost in the international trade context.
These themes are virtually unexplored in the existing economics literature on trade agree-
ments, in part because those models do not accommodate the possibility of renegotiation in a
meaningful way.11 One partial exception is Beshkar (2010b): he considers the optimal design
of a trade agreement with privately observed political pressures and costly transfers, but only
allows for a limited form of renegotiation and focuses instead on the role of the WTO as a
provider of non-binding arbitration for its member governments. Another partial exception is
Bagwell and Staiger (1999), who study the properties of a limited form of renegotiation that
is restricted to satisfy the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity, but their focus is also very
di¤erent from ours. Finally, the possibility of renegotiation is emphasized in the papers by Lu-
dema (2001) and Klimenko et al. (2008), but their focus is on the renegotiation of punishment
strategies in repeated-game models of self-enforcing agreements.
By contrast, in the law and economics literature analogous issues have been extensively
studied in a domestic context. There are two related literatures. A fundamental question in
the literature concerned with domestic contracts (see, for example, Schwartz, 1979, Shavell,
1984 and Ulen, 1984) is when contracting parties would want specic performance as a remedy
10This is widely seen as a fundamental result in law-and-economics. Wikipedia for example states: With
the opportunity to use either liability or property-based rules to protect entitlements, the academic community
soon concluded that the key to guring out which rule to use turned on the transaction costs. Therefore, if
there were low transaction costs, then property rules should be used. If the transaction costs were high, then
liability rules should be used.(see the entry Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability).
11For example, a number of papers (such as Bagwell and Staiger, 2005, Martin and Vergote, 2008, Bagwell,
2009, Beshkar, 2010a and Park, forthcoming) consider the optimal design of trade agreements with privately
observed political pressures, but none of these papers considers the possibility of renegotiation of the agree-
ment. Howse and Staiger (2005) investigate whether the GATT/WTO reciprocity rule might be interpreted as
facilitating e¢ cient breach, but they do not consider the possibility of renegotiation either.
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for contract breach and when they would instead prefer damage payments. There is also a
vast literature (the seminal contributions are Calabresi and Melamed, 1972, and Kaplow and
Shavell, 1996) that is concerned with the related question of when property rules are preferred to
liability rules in the design of domestic law. But all of this literature maintains the assumption
that cash transfers are available (as seems appropriate given the literatures domestic-context
focus). By introducing costly transfers, our paper forges a link between the law-and-economics
theory of optimal legal rules and the economic theory of trade agreements.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section 3
considers a benchmark where no renegotiation is possible. Section 4 characterizes the optimal
agreement in the presence of renegotiation. Section 5 considers a more general class of contracts
that allows not only for a stickassociated with protection, but also for a carrotassociated
with free trade. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs not presented in the text.
2. The Model
We focus on a single industry in which the Home country is the importer and the Foreign
country is the exporter. We focus on a two-country world because this allows us to make the
key points in a more transparent way, but in the concluding section we will briey discuss the
extension to a multi-country setting.
The Home government chooses a binary level of trade policy intervention for the industry,
which we denote by T 2 fFT; Pg: Free Tradeor Protection.The binary policy instrument
helps to keep our analysis tractable, and it captures reasonably well a variety of non-tari¤
policy choices that are discrete in practice, such as trade-related regulatory regimes or product
standards, on which many of the trade disputes in the GATT/WTO have focussed. Finally, we
assume that the Foreign (exporting) government is passive in this industry.
At the time that the Home government makes its trade policy choice, a transfer may also
be exchanged between the governments, but at a cost. Here we seek to capture the feature that
cash transfers between governments are seldom used for providing compensation to trading
partners, while indirect (non-cash) transfers, such as tari¤ adjustments in other sectors or even
non-trade policy adjustments, are more easily available.12 To allow for this possibility in a
12For example, there are no known cases of cash compensation being provided within the context of the escape
clause provisions in GATT Article XIX or the provisions for permanent tari¤ modications in Article XXVIII,
and the resolution of GATT/WTO disputes has, with two exceptions, never involved cash transfers either (the
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tractable way, we let b denote a (positive or negative) transfer from Home to Foreign, with
c(b)  0 the deadweight loss associated with the transfer level b. The transfer cost c(b) is
(weakly) convex and smooth everywhere, with the natural features that c(0) = 0 and c(b) > 0
for b 6= 0. For simplicity, we assume that the Home country bears the deadweight loss c(b), and
that the total cost of the transfer inclusive of deadweight loss, b+ c(b), is increasing for all b.13
The Home governments payo¤ is given by
!(T; b) = v(T )  b  c(b); (2.1)
where v(T ) is the Home governments valuation of the domestic surplus associated with policy
T in the sector under consideration. We have in mind that v(T ) corresponds to a weighted
sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus and revenue from trade policy intervention, with the
weights possibly reecting political economy concerns (as in, e.g., Baldwin, 1987, and Grossman
and Helpman, 1994). As the Foreign government is passive in this industry, its payo¤ is
!(T; b) = v(T ) + b; (2.2)
where v(T ) is the Foreign governments valuation of foreign surplus associated with policy T .
Using (2.1) and (2.2), the joint payo¤ of the two governments is denoted as 
 and given by

(T; b) = v(T ) + v(T )  c(b): (2.3)
We assume that Home always gains from protection, and we denote this gain as
  v(P )  v(FT ):
This gain may be interpreted as arising from some combination of terms-of-trade and political
considerations. On the other hand, we assume that Foreign always loses from protection, and
we denote this loss as
  v(FT )  v(P ):
two exceptions to date are the US-Copyright case see WTO, 2007, pp. 283-286 and the Brazil-Cotton case 
see Schnepf, 2010). However, countries do sometimes achieve indirect payment of compensation through various
forms of policy adjustments in other sectors (e.g., the GATT/WTO self-helpmethod of tari¤-retaliation).
Our implicit assumption is that these other policies are set e¢ ciently, so that any adjustments to them then
entails a deadweight loss.
13If the deadweight loss were borne by the Foreign country, none of our qualitative results would change,
provided b   c(b) is increasing for all b. Note that both of these assumptions (b + c(b) and b   c(b) increasing
for all b) are satised if jc0(b)j < 1 for all b.
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The joint (positive or negative) gain from protection is then       .
Below we will refer to the outcome that maximizes joint surplus as the rst bestoutcome.
This outcome is easily described: if   > 0 (or  > ), the rst best is T = P and b = 0, and if
  < 0 (or  < ), the rst best is T = FT and b = 0. Notice that b always equals zero under
the rst best, because transfers are costly to execute.
We assume that governments are ex-ante uncertain about the joint gains from protection
  (or equivalently the joint benets from free trade,   ), but they observe   ex post. We
also assume that   is not veriable, i.e. not observed ex post by the court/dispute-settlement-
body (DSB), so that governments cannot write a complete contingent contract.14 We consider
the simplest environment of this kind that allows us to make the relevant points. We assume
that  is known ex-ante, so that all the uncertainty in   originates from , and that  is not
veriable.15 In the Conclusion we briey discuss the case in which  is also uncertain (and not
veriable). But there is also a further motivation besides simplicity for considering the case
in which  is known ex ante. This is the case that is most favorable to the so-called e¢ cient
breachargument, according to which e¢ ciency can be induced if Foreign is made whole with
a damage payment of  in the event of breach. We will show that, even in this most-favorable
case, the standard argument for a liability rule must be qualied in our setting along a number
of important dimensions.
We denote by h() the ex-ante distribution of , which we assume to be common knowledge
(to the governments as well as the DSB). The density h() is dened over the positive real
line,  2 [0;1). We let  and  denote the bounds of the support of , or more formally,
 = inff : h() > 0g and  = supf : h() > 0g. To make things interesting, we assume that
 is strictly positive and that the value  =  is in the interior of the support of , so that
the rst-best is P in some states (when  > , and hence   > 0) and FT in some states (when
 < , and hence   < 0).
The fact that governments cannot write a complete contingent contract does not necessarily
imply ine¢ ciencies. If transfers were costless (no deadweight loss), then governments could
14Other papers that also model trade agreements as incomplete contracts include Copeland (1990), Bagwell
and Staiger (2001), Horn (2006), Costinot (2008), Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010) and Maggi and Staiger
(2011). We will use the expressions courtand DSBinterchangeably. Note that in our model the role of the
court/DSB is simply that of an external enforcer of the contract, as in standard models of contracting.
15These informational assumptions, namely that uncertainty is one-dimensional and that the uncertain para-
meter is not veriable by the court but is observed by both parties, are relatively standard in the literature on
mechanism design with renegotiation (see for example Segal and Whinston, 2002). Also, whether the uncertainty
over  reects underlying uncertainty about v(FT ) or v(P ) or both is immaterial for our results.
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always achieve the rst best by engaging in ex-post (i.e., after observing ) negotiations over
policies and (costless) transfers. With costly transfers, on the other hand, the rst best cannot
be achieved in general, but ex-ante joint surplus may be enhanced by writing a contract ex ante
(before  is realized). We look for the contract that maximizes ex-ante joint surplus.16
The contract can be of two di¤erent types. The rst type of contract is a property rule,
which either assigns the right of free trade to the exporter (we will sometimes refer to this as a
prohibitiveproperty rule), or assigns the right to protect to the importer (we refer to this as
a discretionaryproperty rule). The second type of contract is a liability rule, which is a menu
contract that gives the Home country a choice between (i) setting FT and (ii) setting P and
compensating the Foreign country with a payment bD. Using slightly di¤erent terminology,
this type of contract species a baseline commitment (FT ) but allows Home to escape this
commitment by paying a certain amount of damages. In section 5 we will consider a more
general type of contract that may specify a transfer also for the FT choice; in the basic model
we focus on the simpler type of contract because it makes the main insights more transparent.17
Note that a prohibitive property rule is outcome-equivalent to an extreme liability rule in
which bD is set prohibitively high (i.e. such that the importer chooses FT in all states of
the world), and a discretionary property rule is outcome-equivalent to a liability rule at the
other extreme in which bD = 0. Therefore, at a formal level we can focus without loss of
generality on the family of liability contracts described above and simply optimize the level of
bD. However, we will call the contracts at the two extremes (bD = 0 and bD prohibitively high)
16There are three ways to justify this emphasis on the maximization of the governmentsex-ante joint surplus.
One possibility is to allow for costless ex-ante transfers, i.e., transfers at the time the institution is created. This
justication is not in contradiction with our assumption of costly ex-post transfers, if it is interpreted as reecting
the notion that the cost of transfers can be substantially eliminated in an ex-ante setting such as a GATT/WTO
negotiating round where many issues are on the table at once (see, for example, the discussion in Hoekman
and Kostecki, 1995, Ch. 3). A second possibility would be to keep the single-sector model and introduce a veil
of ignorance, so that ex-ante there is uncertainty over which of the two governments will be the importer and
which the exporter. And a third possibility would be to introduce a second mirror-image sector, so that the
game is overall symmetric; in this case, if the governments focus on the symmetric point of the Pareto frontier,
this maximizes the sum of their payo¤s.
17In our simple model, bD is noncontingent. But in a richer model where some state-of-the-world variables
are veriable and some are not, bD could be made contingent on the veriable variables. This would allow for
(partially) contingent liability rules and (partially) contingent property rules. It is useful to keep this in mind
because in real-world trade agreements we do observe contingent property and liability rules. Consider, for
instance, the WTO. An example of a contingent liability rule is given by the provisions for tari¤ modications
in GATT Article XXVIII, where the compensation due to the exporting country in case of a tari¤ increase is
contingent on the trade e¤ects of such a tari¤ change. And an example of a contingent property rule is given
by the prohibition against quantitative restrictions, which applies strictly as a default, but does not apply at
all under certain exceptionalcontingencies (such as a balance of payments crises, see GATT Article XII).
10
property rules.18 We choose to emphasize the property-rule interpretation rather than the
extreme-liability-rule interpretation in order to connect with the ongoing debate on the optimal
design of trade agreements that we described in the Introduction. It is also important to keep
in mind that the di¤erence between a liability rule and a property rule is not just a matter of
degree (the level of the damages bD), but there is an important qualitative di¤erence as well:
a liability rule is in essence a separating contract, since it induces the importer to choose
di¤erent policies in di¤erent states of the world, while a property rule is in essence a pooling
contract, since it induces a noncontingent policy choice.19
We allow the governments to renegotiate the initial contract after the state of the world  is
realized. More specically, we assume that the ex-post negotiation is a Nash bargaining game
with the initial contract serving as the disagreement point. We let  (resp. 1  ) denote the
bargaining power of the Home (resp. Foreign) government. We abstract from underlying issues
of enforcement and simply assume that bargaining outcomes between the two governments are
enforced (we return to this assumption briey in the Conclusion). To summarize, the timing
of events is as follows: (0) Governments write the contract; (1)  is realized and observed by
the governments; (2) governments can renegotiate the terms of the contract (b and T ).
We conclude this section by highlighting an alternative interpretation of the contract-design
problem described above. The literal interpretation is that governments write a contract that
species two options for the importer (choosing FT , or choosing P and compensating the
exporter with the payment bD), and the DSB simply enforces the contract. The alternative
interpretation is that governments design an institution consisting of two parts: (i) a simple
fFTg contract with no contractually specied means of escape; and (ii) a mandate for the DSB
to implement a certain remedy for breach (the payment bD). Our analysis applies equally well
under either of these interpretations (i.e., whether the contract includes an escape provision, or
rather a remedy for breach is specied in the DSB mandate), and both of these interpretations
are relevant for the GATT/WTO: some WTO clauses take the form of explicit option contracts,
for example the escape clause in GATT Article XIX and the provisions for tari¤ modications
in Article XXVIII; but there are also many contractual commitments for which, when they
18Kaplow and Shavell (1996) make the same observation and adopt a similar approach.
19Arguably, a property rule is also likely to be substantially simpler than a liability rule, because under
a liability rule the optimal bD will inevitably depend on the specics of the issue area (or the sector) being
regulated, so the agreement may have to specify a di¤erent bD for each clause. By contrast, with a property
rule, the penalty (zero or prohibitive) need not be issue-specic and could be specied as an agreement-wide
default.
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apply, there is no escape provision (e.g., the rules governing actionableproduction subsidies,
and the ban on export subsidies), and in this case the relevant question is what should be the
appropriate remedy applied by the DSB in case of breach. Under either interpretation, the level
of the breach remedy is important for the same reason: it serves to dene the disagreement
point provided by the legal system should ex-post negotiations fail.20
3. The No-Renegotiation Benchmark
Before characterizing the optimal agreement in the presence of renegotiation, it is instructive
rst to consider the simpler setting where ex-post negotiation is not possible. In this setting
governments can be viewed as simply designing a contract ex ante (to maximize ex-ante joint
surplus) and then implementing it ex post, and choosing a level of damages bD amounts to
stipulating the actual level of damages that must be paid by Home if it chooses P .
We start by noting that, given bD, the importer will choose FT if and only if its gain from
protection, , is below some threshold level ^. The threshold level ^ is the value of  for which
the importer is indi¤erent between FT and P -plus-damages-bD, and is given by ^ = bD+c(bD).
The threshold ^ summarizes the policy allocationinduced by the contract, and we say that
^ is implementedby the level of damages bD if ^ = bD + c(bD).
It is useful to highlight how the notions of property rules and liability rules map into values
of ^. For this purpose, we dene the prohibitive level of damages bprohib as the minimum
value of bD such that the importer chooses FT for all  in the support (; ), which is dened
implicitly by bD + c(bD) = . Clearly, then, setting a discretionary property rule (bD = 0)
corresponds to setting ^ = 0; a prohibitive property rule (bD  bprohib) corresponds to ^  ;
and a liability rule (bD 2 (0; bprohib)) corresponds to a value ^ that is strictly between 0 and .
It is helpful to write the optimal contracting problem as choosing the transfer bD and
the policy allocation ^ to maximize the ex-ante joint surplus, subject to the implementation
constraintbD + c(bD) = ^. Letting E
?(bD; ^) denote the ex-ante joint surplus given bD and
^ when no ex-post negotiation is possible, we can state the optimal contracting problem as
20There is a semantic distinction in the law-and-economics literature according to which, if a trade agreement
is viewed as a piece of international law then the property-rule/liability-rule terminology would be used, whereas
if a trade agreement is viewed as a contract then the analogous distinction is between a contract that requires






D; ^) = V (FT ) +
1Z
^
(   )dH()  c(bD)[1 H(^)] (3.1)
s:t: bD + c(bD) = ^;
where V (FT )  v(FT ) + v(FT ). The expression for E
?(bD; ^) in (3.1) is the sum of three
terms. The rst is the joint surplus under a rigid FT policy and no transfers; the second
captures the gains in joint surplus associated with allowing the policy P for  > ^; and the
third reects the deadweight loss associated with the transfer bD and policy allocation ^.
Note that, if there is no cost of transfers (c()  0), the objective in (3.1) is clearly max-
imized by ^ = , the rst best allocation; but if c() > 0, it may be optimal to deviate from
this allocation. Next note that, if c() > 0, implementing the rst best allocation implies a
deadweight loss, which is given by c(bD)[1   H()]; this can be interpreted as the sorting
cost.This cost is incurred for all states higher than , which explains why it is weighted by
[1   H()]. Thus, in the absence of renegotiation, the tradeo¤ in choosing ^, and hence the
optimal level of damages, can be understood in very simple terms: the choice of ^ hinges on
the comparison between the e¢ ciency cost of deviating from the rst best allocation and the
savings in sorting costs that can be achieved by doing so.
To maximize the objective in (3.1), we can use the implementation constraint to solve for
the value of bD that implements ^, plug this into the objective function and optimize ^. We let
bD?(^) denote the value of b
D that implements ^. Di¤erentiating E












= (   ^)  h(^) + c()  h(^)  c
0()
1 + c0()  [1 H(^)]: (3.2)
The rst term of dE
?
d^
captures the marginal e¢ ciency gain of increasing ^: this is positive if
^ <  and negative otherwise. The second term and third term together capture the marginal
savings in sorting costs (positive or negative) from increasing ^: the second term is positive
because increasing ^ reduces the range of states for which the importer government chooses to
pay the transfer, while the third term is negative because increasing ^ requires an increase in
the transfer, which will be paid for all states higher than ^.
At this point one might proceed with a localapproach, and ask how the objective can be
improved starting from the rst best allocation ^ = : Does improvement require increasing
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or decreasing ^? Or formally, what is the sign of dE
?
d^
at ^ = ? Clearly, the sign is positive
if and only if sorting costs are saved by increasing ^ slightly from , but this is ambiguous
because, as explained above, the marginal savings in sorting costs are composed of two e¤ects




^ =  is positive if and only if d ln c
d^
> h(^)
1 H(^) : thus the answer hinges on a comparison between
the proportional change in the deadweight loss and the (inverse of) the hazard rate at ^, and
a local approach cannot therefore take us very far.
Partly because of the feature we just highlighted, the predictions about the nature of the
optimal rules in the no-renegotiation case are somewhat ambiguous. The only sharp prediction
obtains under the scenario in which uncertainty about  is small, in the sense that the support
of  around  is small: in this case, a property rule must be optimal. To see why, consider
a liability rule, that is a value of ^ within (0; ). It is easy to see that such a value of ^ is




1+c0() < 0 for all ^ between
0 and  (because h = 0 for all these values).21 This implies that ^ = 0 dominates all values of ^
between 0 and , and moreover ^ = 0 dominates ^ =  by a discrete margin, and by continuity
will dominate any ^ within the support (; ) provided that this support is su¢ ciently small.22
Intuitively, a liability rule can achieve a contingent, and hence more e¢ cient, policy allocation,
but the associated gain is small when the support of  is small, and it is overwhelmed by the
deadweight loss from the transfer.
Let us focus now on the opposite case, in which uncertainty is large. We nd that, if the
support of  is su¢ ciently large, a prohibitive property rule ^   is necessarily suboptimal,
but the discretionary property rule cannot be ruled out. To understand the rst of these two
claims, start by noting that the rst two terms in (3.2) collapse to (   bD?(^))  h(^) (using
the denition of bD?(^)). Next note that b
D
?(^) > 




^ in a left neighborhood of . This implies that ^   is dominated by setting ^ slightly lower
than . On the other hand, the discretionary property rule ^ = 0 can under some conditions
be a maximum. To see why, notice that, since bD?(0) = 0 and c




j^=0 =  h(0). If h(0) = 0 then ^ = 0 is a stationary point, and in this case one can show
21Recall that  > 0, and so when the support of  around  is su¢ ciently small we must have that  > 0.
22It can be shown that a liability rule is dominated also by the prohibitive property rule ^  . This cannot
be seen easily from (3.2), but one way to see it intuitively is to focus on the symmetric case where E = : in
this case the two property rules yield the same expected joint surplus, and hence if a liability rule is dominated
by one property rule it is also dominated by the other.
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that if h0(0) is su¢ ciently small then ^ = 0 is a local maximum, and it is straightforward to
construct examples in which ^ = 0 is a global maximum. Intuitively, when uncertainty is large
and renegotiation is not possible, it may be best to allow full discretion (P always), because
inducing FT even for just the lowest levels of  i.e. those states where FT is most desirable
for joint surplus requires a transfer that will occur in equilibrium for all higher levels of  
i.e. those states in which the importer will choose P and the resulting transfer costs may be
too high to be worthwhile.
To summarize our analysis thus far, in the no-renegotiation scenario the key tradeo¤ is
conceptually simple. A liability rule can insure against extreme realizations of  but it entails
transfer costs, while a property rule avoids transfer costs but it entails downside risk associated
with extreme realizations of . However, the predictions about the optimal rules are somewhat
ambiguous, at least in the case of large uncertainty. As we will show in the next section,
introducing renegotiation complicates the trade-o¤s, but perhaps surprisingly, leads to sharper
predictions about the optimal rules.
4. The Optimal Agreement in the Presence of Renegotiation
We now turn to the central task of characterizing the optimal agreement in the presence of
renegotiation. In part we can build on the analysis of the no-renegotiation case in the previous
section, because for any level of damages bD the contract characterized there provides the dis-
agreement (threat) point for any renegotiation in the present setting. But to characterize where
governments will actually end up for any realization of  given a level of bD, we must consider
the incentives to renegotiate the initial contract, and this necessitates some new notation and
a somewhat more involved analysis.
The rst question we need to address is the following: Given a contract that species
damages bD, when does renegotiation occur (i.e., for what realizations of ), and in what
direction does it occur (i.e., from P to FT or from FT to P )? As we observed just above,
the threat point in the renegotiation is given by the initial contract, which gives the importer
the option to choose between (T = FT; b = 0) and (T = P; b = bD). Clearly, the importer is
indi¤erent between these two options if  = bD + c(bD)  S(bD). In words, S(bD) is the total
cost of the transfer bD inclusive of deadweight loss, and it is the level of  at which the threat
point switches: under disagreement, for  < S(bD) the importer chooses (T = FT; b = 0),
while for  > S(bD) it chooses (T = P; b = bD). We depict the curve S(bD) in Figure 1. As
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Figure 1 reects, S(bD) is increasing and convex and goes through the origin, and the threat
point is (T = FT; b = 0) below S(bD) and (T = P; b = bD) above it.
Having characterized how the threat point varies with  for a given bD, we can now proceed
to identify the realizations of  for which the initial contract will be renegotiated, and determ-
ine as well the direction of the renegotiation. Note that the analysis of renegotiation is not
straightforward because utility is not transferrable, due to the cost of transfers, and for this
reason we cannot simply focus on the governmentsex-post joint surplus to determine whether
the contract will be renegotiated.
Let us focus rst on the case  < S(bD), where the threat point is (T = FT; b = 0). Clearly,
the governments will renegotiate to the policy P if and only if there exists a transfer be such that
both governments gain by switching from (T = FT; b = 0) to (T = P; b = be), which requires
 > S(be) (for the importer) and be >  (for the exporter). The equilibrium be will then
fall somewhere in the interval [; S 1()], depending on bargaining powers.23 Furthermore,
it is clear that there is a Pareto improvement over the threat point if and only if the interval
[; S 1()] is nonempty, or  > S(). Thus, we can conclude that the contract is renegotiated
toward policy P for values of  such that S() <  < S(bD). This condition identies a region
in (; bD) space, which is highlighted in Figure 1 by the vertical shading (and labeled PR).
Notice that be < bD in this region, given that S(be) <  < S(bD) with S() increasing.
It is useful at this juncture to observe that it can never be strictly optimal to set bD > .
To see why, notice from Figure 1 that setting bD >  induces the same policy allocation as
setting bD =  (namely FT for  < S() and P for  > S()). Therefore, any bD >  is
weakly dominated by bD =  because the latter implies a weakly lower expected transfer.24 A
consequence of this observation is that it will never be the case that in equilibrium the contract
is renegotiated towards P : this follows because renegotiation from FT to P is only possible in
the case where  < S(bD) and the threat point is FT , and as Figure 1 depicts when  < S(bD)
the contract is renegotiated toward P only when bD > , which we have just observed can
23Note that the function S() is invertible, because we assumed that b+ c(b) is increasing everywhere.
24To see this, x a level of bD above , say bD = ~bD > , and replace it with bD = . This decreases
the expected equilibrium transfer (weakly) for two reasons: (1) if  > S(~bD), so that the importer chooses
(T = P; b = bD) without renegotiating, the transfer obviously decreases, and (2) if  2 ( + c(); S(~bD)), so
that the contract is renegotiated, the equilibrium transfer be is higher than , as we showed in the text. We
also note the reason for the qualier that bD >  is weaklydominated by bD = : if the support of  around
 is small, the expected equilibrium transfer is the same in the two cases, because all states  >  + c()
have zero density. But note that, if this is the case, even if bD >  renegotiation from FT to P cannot occur
with positive probability. This explains the sentence that follows in the text.
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never be strictly optimal. Instead, as we will conrm and discuss further below, the only kind
of renegotiation that can occur in equilibrium is from P to FT .
Let us now focus on the case  > S(bD), where the threat point is (T = P; b = bD). In
this case, the governments will renegotiate toward the policy FT if and only if there exists a
(negative) transfer be such that both governments gain by switching from (T = P; b = bD) to
(T = FT; b = be), which requires S(bD)   S(be) >  (for the importer) and  > bD   be (for
the exporter). Again using the denition of S(), the equilibrium be will then fall somewhere
in the interval [bD   ; S 1(S(bD)   )], depending on bargaining powers. Clearly, there
exists a Pareto improvement over the threat point if and only if this interval is nonempty, or
 < S(bD)   S(bD   )  R(bD), hence we can conclude that the contract is renegotiated
toward policy FT when S(bD) <  < R(bD). This condition identies a region in (; bD) space
that is highlighted in Figure 1 by the horizontal shading (and labeled FTR).25
Finally we note that the two renegotiation regions highlighted in Figure 1 are themselves
independent of the bargaining-power parameter . Bargaining powers only a¤ect the exact
amount of transfer be that will be exchanged inside these regions.
Figure 1 summarizes the analysis thus far, and is of central importance for understanding
the results that follow. The two key curves are S(bD) and R(bD). The curve  = S(bD) is
the locus of points where the importers threat point switches between P and FT . If bD < 
(which as we argued is the relevant case), this curve also marks the lower boundary of the
region where governments renegotiate the contract (in the direction of free trade), while the
curve  = R(bD) marks the upper boundary of the renegotiation region.
Our ndings on the pattern of renegotiation are recorded in the following:
Proposition 1. (i) If bD < , the contract is renegotiated for  2 (S(bD); R(bD)), in which
case the governments agree on FT and the exporter compensates the importer. (ii) If bD > ,
the contract is renegotiated for  2 (S(); S(bD)), in which case the governments agree on P
and the importer compensates the exporter; however, setting bD >  is weakly dominated,
and this kind of renegotiation does not happen in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 implies two interesting predictions regarding the pattern and direction of
equilibrium renegotiation. The rst prediction is that, as long as damages are set optimally,
25Note that R(0) =  S( ) > 0, so this region is guaranteed to be nonempty, and note also that R00(bD) <
S00(bD) for all bD, which ensures that the point of intersection between the R curve and the S curve is unique.
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any observed ex-post renegotiation of the ex-ante contract must result in liberalization (from
P to FT ), not protection (from FT to P ). That is, according to Proposition 1, equilibrium
renegotiations all take a particular form in which the importer (respondent) agrees to liberalize
and the exporter (claimant) agrees to pay something for this. What should not occur in
equilibrium according to Proposition 1 is a renegotiation wherein the importers threat point
is FT but the governments agree to a policy of P and a level of damages to the exporter that
is less than the contractually-specied level (be < bD). Intuitively, if renegotiation took this
latter form, it would imply that the contractually-specied damages bD are suboptimally high,
because for the exporter government to agree to such a renegotiation would require  < be,
and hence  < bD; but this cannot be optimal, as we have explained previously.26
The second prediction is that, if bD > 0, renegotiation can occur in equilibrium only for
intermediate values of . Broadly speaking, then, our model predicts that renegotiation is
not an extraordinaryevent that occurs only in extreme states of the world, but instead can
occur only for ordinarystates of the world.27 This is perhaps surprising, since intuition might
suggest that renegotiation should occur in exceptional circumstances where the ex-ante contract
turns out to be highly ine¢ cient ex-post. The reason this intuition is not correct in our model
is that, in extreme states of the world, the initial contract performs well, in the sense that it
induces the importer to make the correct policy choice. Instead, in our model governments may
have incentive to renegotiate (for the relevant range of bD) only if the importer government is
relatively close to indi¤erent between the options placed before it by the initial contract, and
this indi¤erence occurs for an intermediate state of the world ( = S(bD)): if the importer
26Examples of renegotiation that conform to the models equilibrium predictions, in which the respondent
agrees to liberalize and the complainant agrees to pay something for this, are not hard to nd. For instance,
in an early GATT dispute between India and Pakistan regarding export fees levied by Pakistan on jute sold
to India that India claimed violated the MFN obligation, India withdrew its complaint under a settlement (see
GATT, 1953) in which Pakistan agreed to eliminate the discriminatory features of its export taxes in exchange
for an agreement by India to reduce its (non-discriminatory) export tax on coal. A more recent example is
provided by the 2001 compliance settlement for the U.S.-EU Bananadispute in the WTO (see USTR, 2001).
In this settlement, the EU (respondent) agreed to come into compliance with the DSB ruling, but not fully until
2006. Hence, the U.S. (a claimant), by accepting the EUs non-to-partial compliance over the 2001-2006 period,
allowed the EU to take some compensation (by being able to deviate from its WTO commitment over this
period) in exchange for the promise of eventual full compliance. Finally, whether or not renegotiations of the
second type described in the text which should not occur in equilibrium according to the models predictions
are observed in practice is an interesting empirical question, but we are unaware of any evidence from existing
empirical studies that is directly relevant in this regard.
27Note that this result makes no reference to the probabilities of di¤erent realizations of . Thus, in principle,
intermediate values of  could be less likely than extreme values of , and in this sense the former could be
more exceptional than the latter. But this can happen only for very non-standard distributions, so we feel
justied in stating broadly that in our model renegotiation can occur only for ordinarystates of the world.
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prefers P and is far from this indi¤erence point, the exporter will have to pay a large transfer
to convince the importer to switch its policy choice to FT , and this will entail a large dead
weight loss. In this sense, the reason the contract may be renegotiated in equilibrium in our
model reects the ine¢ ciencies of the transfers more than the ine¢ ciencies of the policy itself.
Having characterized the pattern and direction of renegotiation, we can now turn to the
analysis of the optimal contract. An important step towards characterizing the optimal bD
is to ask the following question: What allocations ^ can be implemented in the presence of
renegotiation, and what is the level of damages bD that implements a given ^?
This question is immediately answered by looking at Figure 1. First note that there exists no
level of damages bD that can implement values of ^ outside the interval [R(0); S()]: regardless
of bD, the policy outcome for  > S() is always P , and the policy outcome for  < R(0)
is always FT . This is an important di¤erence relative to the case of no renegotiation: in the
absence of renegotiation, any allocation ^ can be implemented by an appropriate choice of bD.
But when renegotiation is feasible, it is impossible to induce FT for values of  above S(),
or P for values of  below R(0).
Notice also that the range of implementable values of ^ is smaller when the cost of transfer
is lower (it can be veried that decreasing c() leads to an increase in R(0) and a decrease in
S()). This feature is very intuitive in the limiting case where transfers are costless: then
the parties will always renegotiate to the e¢ cient outcome regardless of bD, and hence only
the allocation ^ =  is implementable. This is a manifestation of the Coase theorem: in the
absence of transaction costs the ex-ante contract is irrelevant and the e¢ cient outcome always
obtains ex-post. When transfers are quite costly, on the other hand, the renegotiation outcome
is very sensitive to the level of damages bD specied in the initial contract, and hence the range
of implementable allocations is wider. Thus renegotiation limits the scope of implementation,
and the more so the lower the transfer cost. We let IM^  [R(0); S()] denote the set of
implementable values of ^.
In spite of the fact that renegotiation imposes bounds on implementation, renegotiation is
benecial for ex-ante joint surplus. To see this notice that, for each given bD and , governments
renegotiate only if this leads to an ex-post Pareto improvement. Since renegotiation leads to a
weak ex-post Pareto improvement for all (bD; ), it follows that the ex-ante joint surplus must
also be weakly higher. The following lemma summarizes:
Lemma 1. Renegotiation limits the range of allocations ^ that can be implemented. The
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implementable range of ^ is given by IM^ = [R(0); S()]. However, renegotiation is (weakly)
benecial for the ex-ante joint surplus.
Lemma 1 indicates that, despite placing limits on what can be implemented, the ability
to renegotiate (weakly) enhances the ex-ante joint surplus of the governments. We note that
this feature contrasts with other mechanism design settings (e.g., the hold-up and risk-sharing
environments studied in Segal and Whinston, 2002) where the ability to renegotiate ex-post
can be harmful to ex-ante surplus, for the simple reason that our model abstracts from the
sorts of ex-ante investment/risk-aversion issues that are the focus of those settings.28
We next ask, what level of bD is required to implement a given ^? From Figure 1 it is clear
that implementing a given ^ in IM^ requires bD(^) = R 1(^). Note that bD(^) is increasing in




as well that bD(^)  bD?(^) for all ^ 2 IM^: in spite of the fact that renegotiation limits the
scope of implementation, it takes a lower level of contractually-specied damages to implement
a given ^ than in the absence of renegotiation (for ^ in the implementable set).
Finally, it is important to recall that the level of damages bD(^) specied in the contract is
not necessarily the transfer that occurs in equilibrium, since the contract may be renegotiated,
so Lemma 1 does not tell us the cost of implementing ^. For ^ 2 IM^, this cost includes two
components: (1) the cost of the transfer be() made when the contract is renegotiated, which
is the case for  2 (S(bD(^)); ^), and (2) the cost of the transfer bD made when the contract is
not renegotiated and the importer chooses (T = P; b = bD), which is the case for  > ^.
Armed with the observations above, we can now write down the optimization problem in
the presence of renegotiation. Recalling that we can focus on bD   and that for this range




(bD; ^) = V (FT ) +
1Z
^




s:t: ^ = R(bD); bD  
There are two main di¤erences between this optimization problem and the optimization
problem in (3.1) that applies when renegotiation is not possible: rst, the expected cost of
28It is also relevant to observe that e¤orts to renegotiate ex-post are actively encouraged (and even mandated)
in the context of GATT/WTO disputes. Our nding that renegotiation is benecial is consistent with this stance.
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transfers now includes not only the cost of the transfer bD for states in which the contract is
not renegotiated and the importer chooses (T = P; b = bD), but also the cost of the transfer be
that is paid by the exporter when renegotiation occurs; and second, the level of bD required to
implement a given ^ is lower than in the case of no renegotiation, as we highlighted above.
A nal ingredient for nding the optimal level of contractually-stipulated damages bD is
understanding how the level of bD a¤ects the transfer be paid by the exporter when renegotiation
occurs. Intuitively, increasing bD strengthens the bargaining position of the exporter and hence
decreases be in absolute size. To see this more formally, note that in the FTR region be solves
the generalized Nash bargaining problem:
max
b
NB(b; bD)   !(FT; b)  !(P; bD)  !(FT; b)  !(P; bD)1  .
By standard monotone comparative-statics results, @b
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@bD




which, using the explicit expression NB(b; bD) =
 
S(bD)  S(b)     + b  bD1 , is pos-
itive. As be < 0 in the FTR region, it follows that
@jbej
@bD
< 0. We record this nding in
Lemma 2. For (bD; ) in the FTR region, where governments renegotiate to FT and be < 0,




We are now ready to study the optimal level of bD, and in particular compare property rules
with liability rules in the presence of renegotiation. Recall that the discretionary property rule
is dened as bD = 0; the prohibitive property rule as bD  bprohib (where bprohib is determined
by S(bprohib) = ); and a liability rule as bD 2 (0;bprohib).
Before proceeding, however, it is important to emphasize how the introduction of renego-
tiation changes the tradeo¤ involved in the choice between liability rules and property rules.
Recall that, in the absence of renegotiation, the tradeo¤ is fairly simple: property rules avoid
the cost of transfers but imply rigid policy outcomes, whereas liability rules can introduce
policy exibility but imply some waste associated with the use of transfers. If governments are
able to renegotiate the contract, on the other hand, this tradeo¤ is complicated by the fact
that the policy outcome is no longer necessarily rigid under property rules; by the fact that
renegotiation imposes a limit on the policy allocations that can be implemented; and perhaps
most importantly, by the fact that the level of bD a¤ects the equilibrium payments that are
made when governments renegotiate. But as we now show, in spite of this more complicated
tradeo¤, the introduction of renegotiation actually sharpens the results of the model.
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We focus rst on the case of small uncertainty. In this case, a property rule must be optimal,
and the logic is similar to the case of no renegotiation. Figure 2 depicts the relevant features
of the small-uncertainty case. First note from Figure 2 that, if the support of  around  is
su¢ ciently small, a property rule (bD = 0 or bD  bprohib) is not renegotiated for any , and
hence it induces zero transfers in equilibrium. A liability rule may achieve a more e¢ cient
policy allocation than a property rule, since the policy can be made contingent on , but the
associated benet is small because the support of  around  is small. On the other hand,
the cost of achieving this state-contingency is not small, because implementing a threshold ^
close to  requires a level of damages bD that is close to R 1() and hence does not become
negligible as the support shrinks.29 In this case, it is straightforward to establish that the
optimum is bD = 0 if E >  and bD  bprohib if E < .
Let us focus next on the case where uncertainty is su¢ ciently large. It is helpful to refer
back to Figure 1 for this case. Suppose that  < R(0) and  > S(). Recalling that the
implementable range of ^ is IM^ = [R(0); S()], this is the case in which the support includes
high- states in which the policy outcome is P regardless of the initial contract, and it includes
low- states in which the policy outcome is FT regardless of the initial contract. In this case,
a liability rule must be optimal. To see why, rst note that in this case bprohib > , and recall
from Proposition 1 that bD >  can never be optimal, so a prohibitive property rule cannot
be optimal. Next consider the discretionary property rule bD = 0. Note that, given bD = 0, for
all  > R(0) the contract is not renegotiated and the outcome is (P; b = 0); for these states,
increasing bD slightly from zero entails only a second-order loss, since the marginal cost of the
transfer is zero at b = 0. But for all  < R(0), given bD = 0 the contract is renegotiated and
the exporter pays a sizable transfer be, and recall from Lemma 2 that increasing bD reduces the
size of be: this is a rst-order benet, and hence increasing bD slightly from zero improves the
objective. We can conclude that if the support of  is su¢ ciently large, both property rules are
dominated by a liability rule.
The following proposition summarizes:
Proposition 2. (i) If the support of  is su¢ ciently small, a property rule is optimal (specic-
ally, the optimum is bD = 0 if E >  and bD  bprohib if E < ). (ii) If the support of 
29To be more precise, if ^ is close to  then for states above ^ the transfer bD will be close to R 1(),
which is non-negligible; for states below ^ the contract will be renegotiated, and the equilibrium transfer may
be lower, but this renegotiated transfer is unrelated to the size of the support of  and hence does not become
small as the support shrinks.
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is su¢ ciently large (on both sides of ), the optimum is a liability rule, and in particular the
optimal bD satises 0 < bD <  < bprohib.
As Proposition 2 reects, the introduction of renegotiation leads to sharper predictions
about the optimal rules, despite the fact that the trade-o¤s involved become more subtle. In
particular, when renegotiation is possible, with su¢ ciently large uncertainty a liability rule
dominates both the prohibitive property rule and the discretionary property rule, whereas in
the absence of renegotiation we have shown that the discretionary property rule can be optimal
even when uncertainty is large. And as we have explained, the reason a liability rule dominates
the discretionary property rule in the presence of renegotiation is surprising: introducing a
small bD > 0 in the contract leads to a saving in transfer costs by strengthening the bargaining
position of the exporter, while the policy allocation remains una¤ected.
We have used the support of  as a measure of ex-ante uncertainty. If uncertainty about
 is small in the sense that the density of  is very concentrated around  but the support
is large, then the optimum will not be exactly a property rule, but the result will hold in an
approximate sense, so the qualitative insight goes through. We note as well that the support
of  need only shrink relative to , not in absolute size.
Proposition 2 states that a liability rule is optimal if uncertainty about  is su¢ ciently large,
but in this case the optimal level of bD is lower than the level that makes the exporter whole,
i.e. .30 This result qualies the argument often made in the law-and-economics literature that
the e¢ cient level of damages is the one that makes the injured party whole; and this qualication
arises even under the conditions that are most favorable to this argument, namely that  is
veriable. The source of this qualication comes from our assumption of costly transfers, and
so it applies with particular force to international trade agreements. Specically, in the context
of the WTO compensation often takes the form of tari¤-retaliation by the injured party, hence
it entails ine¢ ciencies, and therefore from an ex-ante perspective it should not be utilized to
an extent that fully compensates the injured party for its loss. This qualication gains special
relevance in light of the emphasis placed on reciprocity in the GATT/WTO system of remedies:
it is sometimes suggested that reciprocity falls short as a mechanism for inducing e¢ cient
outcomes because it does not make the injured party whole (see, for example, Charnovitz,
2002, Lawrence, 2003 and Pauwelyn, 2008), but Proposition 2 suggests that this may in fact
be a desirable feature of reciprocity.
30A similar result has been shown by Beshkar (2010b).
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Moreover, as Proposition 2 indicates, if uncertainty about  is su¢ ciently small, any li-
ability rule is suboptimal (let alone the specic liability rule with bD = ), and instead the
optimum is a property rule. Under the interpretation that uncertainty in  reects primarily
political-economy shocks, Proposition 2 therefore suggests an interesting empirical prediction:
we should tend to observe more liability rules for issue areas where political-economy shocks are
more intense; and conversely, the use of property rules should be more frequent for issue areas
where political-economy shocks are less important. Whether or not this empirical prediction
is borne out in observed trade agreements is an open question, but it is tempting to link this
prediction to what we observe in the GATT/WTO: as we mentioned in the Introduction, export
subsidies and quantitative restrictions (QRs) are prohibited by property rules, while tari¤s and
production subsidies are regulated through a liability-rule approach. One can argue that tari¤s
and production subsidies are subject to considerable political-economy shocks. On the other
hand, export sectors are typically less subject to political pressures than import-competing
sectors;31 hence, export subsidies are arguably less sensitive to political pressures than tari¤s
and production subsidies. And while QRs can in principle be the target of strong lobbying
pressures, the GATT/WTO has successfully tari¢ edmost QRs, thereby channeling political
pressures to a large extent away from QRs and into tari¤s (and perhaps production subsidies),
so QRs are arguably less subject to political economy shocks as well.32
We next highlight two interesting predictions of our model that derive from the underlying
pattern of equilibrium renegotiation. One relates to a key feature of optimal property rules,
while the other relates to the role of bargaining powers for the optimal choice of contract.
First, when a property rule is optimal, it is never renegotiated, and it therefore entails
no equilibrium transfers. This can be seen as follows. Consider a prohibitive property rule
(bD  bprohib). By denition, this entails a bD high enough that for all  in the support the
31This claim has a long history, and it reects the twin observations that it is declining industries rather than
expanding industries that typically receive trade policy support and that it is import-competing industries rather
than exporting industries that are typically in decline. Empirically, these observations have been extensively
documented in the literature. As for why the asymmetric political inuence of import-competing relative to
export sectors arises, there have been a number of proposed answers, including the free-riding and rent-erosion
problems faced by lobbyists in expanding sectors as a result of new entrants (Grossman and Helpman, 1996,
and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007) and the identity bias reecting asymmetries in the political market
(Krueger, 1990, and Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).
32We also note that the degree of uncertainty was a key consideration in the discussions of GATT trade
negotiators on the potential benets of liability rules. As Pauwelyn (2008, p. 137) writes: ...trade negotiators
cannot foresee all possible situations, nor can they predict future economic and political developments, both at
home and internationally. As a result of this uncertainty, they wanted the exibility of a liability rule.This
kind of consideration seems broadly in line with the message of our Proposition 2.
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importers threat point is FT (or S(bD) > ); but we know from Proposition 1 that under
an optimal contract there can never be renegotiation from FT to P , hence when a prohibitive
property rule is optimal it is never renegotiated. Now consider a discretionary property rule
(bD = 0). We have established previously that a necessary condition for this to be optimal is
that when bD = 0 there is no renegotiation for any  (or R(0) < ). Our claim then follows
immediately. We record this in
Proposition 3. When a property rule is optimal, it is never renegotiated, and therefore entails
no equilibrium transfers.
Intuition might have suggested that the possibility of renegotiation should enhance the
performance of property rules, because it insures the contracting parties against the intrinsic
rigidity of such rules. Proposition 3 however tells us that this intuition is not really correct.
The possibility of renegotiation can enhance the performance of a property rule only if such a
rule is suboptimal. If a property rule is optimal, the possibility of renegotiation is immaterial.
In light of Proposition 3, it is relevant to observe that the frequency of renegotiation and
compensation in the GATT/WTO has diminished through time.33 And as we mentioned in
the Introduction, in the view of most legal scholars the GATT/WTO began as a liability-rule
system but has developed over time into a system of property rules.34 Proposition 3 links
these two observations, and suggests that the observed drop in the use of compensation might
be a consequence of this shift in the GATT/WTO from liability to property rules.35 Finally,
we have emphasized the implications of Proposition 3 for changes through time, but we note
33This feature has been noted by, among others, Hoda (2001), Goldstein and Martin (2002), Pauwelyn (2008),
and Pelc (2009). For example, Hoda (2001) notes that during the period 1995-1999 only eight tari¤renegotiations
took place, as opposed to fty-six in the period 1980-89. Pelc (2009) focuses on the decline in compensation
over the history of the GATT/WTO, and documents this decline in the context of GATT/WTO escape clauses.
34Representing this majority view, Jackson (1997, pp. 62-63), argues that the GATT/WTO has evolved from
what was in e¤ect a system of liability rules in the early GATT years to a system of property rules under the
reforms introduced with the creation of the WTO and embodied in the DSB. On the dissenting view, see Hippler
Bello (1996) and Schwartz and Sykes (2002), who view the changes in the DSB that were introduced with the
creation of the WTO as serving instead to return the system to one based squarely on liability rules.
35It is not obvious what may have caused this shift from liability to property rules. According to our model
a reduction in uncertainty could have this e¤ect, but it is not clear that uncertainty has diminished over
time. For this reason, here we emphasize only the prediction of the model concerning the co-variation between
contract form and frequency of renegotiation, which seems consistent with observations. In the conclusion we
suggest an intriguing possibility that arises in a multi-country extension: if renegotiation frictions increase with
membership, then an expansion of membership over time can contribute to an explanation of the shift from
liability to property rules.
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that Proposition 3 suggests an analogous cross-sectional prediction: there should be more
renegotiation and compensation in issue areas regulated by liability rules.
We turn now to the role of bargaining powers for the optimal choice of contract. We
nd that an increase in the importing governments bargaining power  unambiguously favors
property rules over liability rules. The reason is simple. As  rises, the expected transfer as
a result of renegotiations goes up, because by Proposition 1 equilibrium renegotiations always
entail a transfer from the exporter to the importer. Next recall that  has no impact on the
equilibrium policy. These observations, combined with the result of Proposition 3 that there are
no equilibrium renegotiations when property rules are optimal, lead to the following implication:
Proposition 4. As  rises, the optimum can switch from a liability rule to a property rule,
but not vice-versa.
It is interesting to observe that, according to our model, bargaining powers are irrelevant
under an optimal property rule (because by Proposition 3 an optimal property rule is never
renegotiated), while an importing government with low bargaining power (small ) will receive
a relatively low payo¤ under a liability rule. Hence our model indicates that, where signic-
ant power imbalances exist between countries, moving between a liability rule system and a
property rule system will not be distributionally neutral, suggesting in turn that developed
and developing countries might naturally have di¤ering preferences with regard to reforms that
would move an institution in one direction or the other.36
4.1. Costly renegotiation
Thus far we have considered two contracting scenarios: one where renegotiation is frictionless
(earlier in this section), and one where renegotiation is not feasible at all (in section 3). We
36For instance, consider a 2-mirror-image-sectors version of the model along the lines described in note 16, in
which the model is overall symmetric across countries except for a country-specic bargaining power parameter
( for Home and (1  ) for Foreign with  < 1=2), and suppose model parameters are such that property and
liability rules are equally e¢ cient. Then under the property rule, Home and Foreign payo¤s are equal, but under
the liability rule, Home does worse than Foreign. And since the two rules are equally e¢ cient by assumption,
a move from the property rule to the liability rule would then require that Foreign compensate Home. In
the case of the GATT/WTO, one might expect based on our results that developing countries would take a
skeptical view of reforms that had the impact of moving the system away from property rules and toward liability
rules. This prediction is broadly in line with bargaining positions taken by member governments over proposed
institutional reforms that would have elevated the role of compensation as a buy outof ones obligations in
the GATT/WTO (see, for example, the discussion in Pelc, 2009, and the references cited therein, as well as the
complementary discussion in Pauwelyn, 2008, pp. 90-93).
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now examine a range of intermediate scenarios where renegotiation is feasible but is costly. Our
main objective is to understand how renegotiation frictions impact the choice between property
rules and liability rules. This question is interesting in its own right, but a further motivation
for considering this extension comes from the law-and-economics literature. As mentioned in
the Introduction, a central result in this literature is that an increase in renegotiation frictions
favors liability rules over property rules (Calabresi and Melamed, 1972, and Kaplow and Shavell,
1996), and indeed this result is very intuitive: property rules are rigid in nature, so they work
well only if renegotiation is easy.37 In our setting, as we show next, this result is reversed,
and the reason lies in the fact that utility is nontransferable in our model, whereas the above-
mentioned law-and-economics models assume transferable utility.
We consider a simple extension of our basic model, wherein governments must pay a xed
(deadweight) costK if they want to renegotiate the contract. Let  (resp. (1 )) be the share of
this cost borne by Home (resp. Foreign). This is a cost that is incurred only if the renegotiation
is successful, so it reduces the available surplus but does not a¤ect the disagreement utilities.38
To take a rst intuitive pass at this question, let us compare the two extreme scenarios: the
case in which renegotiation is costless (K = 0) and the case in which renegotiation is not feasible
(K = 1). The nding in Proposition 3 implies that removing the possibility of renegotiation
favors property rules over liability rules. This is because an optimal property rule is never
renegotiated, while as we have established above, when renegotiation occurs it increases joint
surplus; hence, removing the possibility of renegotiation can only increase the attractiveness of
a property rule relative to a liability rule.
The above reasoning suggests that increasing K should favor property rules. However this
reasoning is incomplete, because a change in K a¤ects be when renegotiation occurs, and this
indirect e¤ect can in principle o¤set the direct intuitive e¤ect. But as we now show, even if
this indirect e¤ect works in the wrongdirection, it can never outweigh the direct e¤ect.
We start by deriving the regions in (bD; ) space where the contract is renegotiated, for a
given renegotiation cost K. Focus rst on the region where  < S(bD), so that the importers
threat point is FT . For the contract to be renegotiated, there must exist a be such that (i) the
37In fact, it is this result, applied to the GATT/WTO context, that leads Pauwelyn (2008, p. 66) to the
following statement: On balance, one can therefore expect that Calabresi and Melameds third reason for
liability rules (high transaction costs) can nd particular application in the international context.
38If the cost of renegotiation were a sunk cost, rather than a xed cost, it could potentially introduce a hold-up
issue in the process of renegotiation, since incurring this cost would be akin to an ex-ante investment from the
point of view of an individual government. We abstract from this aspect here.
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importer is better o¤, which requires  > S(be) +K, and (ii) the exporter is better o¤, which
requires be > +(1 )K. Clearly, this is the case if and only if  > S(+(1 )K)+K >
S(). It follows that the PR region is as depicted in Figure 3. Intuitively, as K increases, the
horizontal line  = S( + (1  )K) + K shifts up, thus the PR region shrinks.
Next focus on the region where  > S(bD), so that the importers threat point is P . For
the contract to be renegotiated, there must exist a be such that (i) the importer is better
o¤, which requires  < S(bD)  S(be)  K, and (ii) the exporter is better o¤, which requires
be > bD  (1 )K. This is the case if and only if  < S(bD) S(bD +(1 )K) K 
R(bD;K). The FTR region is also depicted in Figure 3. Note that as K increases the curve
R(bD;K) shifts down, thus the FTR region shrinks.
Having derived the renegotiation regions in the presence of the renegotiation cost, the next
step is to assess how an increase in K a¤ects the relative performance of property vs. liability
rules. The key steps of the argument, spelled out in the Appendix, are two. First we show that,
as in the case of costless renegotiation, an optimal property rule is never renegotiated. And
second, we then argue that a small increase in K has two rst-order e¤ects on the performance
of a liability rule: a direct (weakly) negative e¤ect, since it reduces the renegotiation surplus;
and an indirect e¤ect through be, which can be positive or negative, but even if positive, can
never outweigh the negative direct e¤ect.
The following proposition (proved in the Appendix) states the result:
Proposition 5. As K increases, the optimum may switch from a liability rule to a property
rule, but not vice-versa.
Proposition 5 highlights the impact of renegotiation costs, which is a distinct type of trans-
action cost from the one that we have focused on more directly  the cost of transfers. It
is interesting to observe that, if utility were transferable, renegotiation costs would have the
opposite e¤ect, that is, they would favor liability rules.39 This suggests that these di¤erent
forms of transaction costs interact in nontrivial ways, and it points to the importance of taking
transfer costs into account when evaluating the e¤ects of bargaining frictions. Moreover, this
observation explains why our result is at odds with the conclusion of the law-and-economics
39To see this, suppose that transfers are costless (i.e., c(b)  0). In this case, with frictionless renegotiation,
liability rules are equivalent to property rules, because both achieve the rst best; while if renegotiation is
costly, the unique optimum is a liability rule with bD =  (i.e. the exporter must be made whole). Hence, if
transfers are costless, renegotiation costs favor liability rules, in contrast with the case of costly transfers.
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literature mentioned above, that renegotiation frictions tend to favor liability rules over prop-
erty rules. Relative to that literature, our novel nding arises because of our focus on a world
with costly transfers, which as we have indicated are an important feature of the international
government-to-government contracting environment.40
Finally, notice that Propositions 3 and 5 taken together suggest a kind of complementarity
between liability rules and renegotiation when transfers are costly. In this environment, lowering
the cost of renegotiation makes liability rules more attractive, and the adoption of liability rules
makes renegotiation more likely in equilibrium.
5. A More General Class of Contracts
Thus far we have considered a family of menu contracts that admits a natural partition into
liability rules and property rules. While a property rule amounts to granting the right of P to
the importer (when damages are set to zero) or the right of FT to the exporter (when damages
are set at a prohibitive level), a liability rule can be thought of as introducing a stick bD
attached to the choice of P (when bD is strictly positive but set at a non-prohibitive level).
We now ask whether it is desirable in the presence of a liability rule to introduce as well
a carrot bFT attached to the choice of FT . We accomplish this by considering a more
general class of menu contracts of the type {(P; bD); (FT; bFT )}, where in principle bD and bFT
could be positive or negative. Notice that there is no role for a carrot in a property rule,
because by denition a property rule simply assigns property rights without specifying any
ex-post transfers.41 But the introduction of a carrot might be optimal as a complement to a
stick/liability rule. And if it is optimal, the question then arises whether a property rule can
still be optimal when a carrot is available for use with a liability rule.
We nd that the performance of a liability rule can always be enhanced by the use of
an appropriately chosen carrot bFT < 0. The reason for this can be understood as follows.
Under a liability rule, there will be some states of the world (some s) where the importer
40It is true that the type of renegotiation friction that we consider here di¤ers from that typically considered
by the law-and-economics literature (namely, the presence of private information). Nevertheless, as we have
observed above and shown in note 39, the reason for the reversal of the results has to do with non-transferable
utility, not the exact nature of the bargaining friction.
41For the more restricted class of menu contracts that we considered in earlier sections, we observed that a
discretionary (prohibitive) property rule is outcome equivalent to a liability rule with bD set at zero (bD set
at a prohibitively high level). This outcome equivalence extends naturally to the more general class of menu
contracts that we consider here when bFT = 0.
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would be willing to select FT for a very small transfer from the exporter, but the importer
can exploit its bargaining power (i.e.,  > 0) to extract a sizable transfer be from the exporter
in order to be induced away from the threat point (P; bD) to a policy of FT . Introducing a
small carrot bFT < 0 for FT ips the importers threat point for these s from (P; bD) to
(FT; bFT ) and thereby undercuts the ability of the importer to hold out for a bigger transfer
from the exporter, ensuring that for these s the importer will then select FT and be paid the
contractually specied bFT . And from the point of view of ex-ante e¢ ciency, the elimination of
large transfers (be) that would have to be paid in a few states of the world is worth the addition
of a very small transfer (bFT ) to be paid in (possibly) many states of the world. The upshot,
then, is that introducing a small carrot for good behaviorcan be helpful in the presence of a
liability rule, even when that carrot is a costly/ine¢ cient means of transferring surplus between
governments; and paradoxically, o¤ering a reward to the importer for FT hurts the importer,
by taking away from him the credible threat of choosing P .
As noted above, this raises a second question: Can a property rule still be optimal when a
carrot is available for use with a liability rule? Here we nd that the answer is Yes,and in
particular that the availability of a carrot for use with a liability rule does not alter our previous
nding that a property rule (liability rule) is optimal if uncertainty is su¢ ciently small (large).
The following proposition (proved in the Appendix) summarizes the discussion thus far:
Proposition 6. Consider menu contracts of the type {(P; bD); (FT; bFT )}: (i) If the support
of  is su¢ ciently small, a property rule is optimal; (ii) If the support of  is su¢ ciently large
(on both sides of ), it is optimal to use a carrot (bFT < 0) together with a liability rule/stick
(bD > 0), and in particular the optimal bD satises 0 < bD <  < bprohib.
Notice that if a liability rule is not optimal in the restricted class of menu contracts considered in
previous sections, it might become optimal in the more general class considered here, because the
use of a carrot can enhance the value of a liability rule as we have observed. What Proposition
6 shows is that, while the quantitative thresholds may change, it is nevertheless true that the
qualitative ndings of Proposition 2 extend to this more general class of contracts.
We have focused above on establishing that Proposition 2 extends to the more general class of
contracts considered here, but it is straightforward to check that each of our other Propositions
extend to this setting as well.42 In particular, Proposition 1 extends with modication only in
42Lemma 2 also extends to this setting. In fact, the only result from earlier sections that does not extend to
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the critical levels of bD and , while Propositions 3-5 extend without modication.
It is interesting to consider whether the kind of carrot mechanism described in Proposition 6
is observed in actual trade agreements such as the WTO. On the one hand, when a government
agrees to reduce its tari¤s as a result of a trade negotiation, it typically considers this to be a
concession that is only valuable to it in exchange for similar concessions from other governments.
So it is clearly the norm for a government to receive some form of compensation from other
governments when it agrees to a policy of free trade. According to this observation, the ndings
recorded in Proposition 6 could potentially be interpreted as suggesting a novel role played by
the compensations for trade liberalization that we observe. But when interpreting the carrot
bFT , it must be remembered that this is an ex-post transfer, which is contractually specied
to be executed after the state of the world  has been observed as an additional (ex post)
reward for contract performance. When put this way, it is less clear that the carrotdevice
represented in Proposition 6 can be found in existing trade agreements.
Finally, we close our discussion of this more general class of contracts by emphasizing that,
while it is optimal under some circumstances to include a carrot bFT in the contract, its inclusion
does not alter in any substantive way our results from the previous section, and indeed as we
have observed, all of our Propositions extend to this setting as well.
6. Conclusion
We have characterized the optimal design of trade agreements in a model where governments can
renegotiate the agreement ex-post subject to a key transaction cost, namely that compensation
between governments is ine¢ cient. We have argued that these two features, renegotiation and
ine¢ cient government-to-government transfers, gure prominently in the GATT/WTO and
other trade agreements. Our model delivers predictions concerning the optimal form of the
agreement, the conditions under which the agreement will be renegotiated in equilibrium, and
the form that such renegotiation will take. A key question on which we have focused is whether
the agreement should be structured as a system of property rules or liability rules. In
this respect our paper forges a link between the theory of trade agreements and the law-and-
economics theory of optimal legal rules. We have shown that answers to this question diverge
from those provided by the law and economics literature once the ine¢ ciency of transfers is
the more general class of contracts considered here is Lemma 1: when a carrot is available, renegotiation does
not limit the range of allocations that can be implemented.
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introduced, indicating that the ine¢ ciency of government-to-government transfers distinguishes
the trade-agreement setting from domestic legal environments in important ways.
To preserve tractability and focus on the main points, we have made a number of strong
assumptions. For example, as we mentioned earlier, one important limitation of a liability-rule
approach from which our model abstracts and which is often emphasized in the informal law-
and-economics literature is that a liability rule requires veriability of the harm inicted by a
countrys trade policy on its trading partner(s), and in practice this can often be di¢ cult to
come by. In ongoing work, we allow that the level of harm is not perfectly veriable, and the
DSB (if invoked) can observe a noisy signal of this harm. We nd that, in itself, imperfect
veriability of the level of harm makes liability rules relatively less attractive, which is not
surprising. But an advantage of studying this noisy-verication setting is that it can generate
positive predictions regarding the propensity of governments to settle early versus going to
court(i.e., invoking the DSB to generate a noisy signal and issue a ruling), and more generally
regarding the outcome of trade disputes.
We have also assumed that neither government possesses private information, an assumption
that has helped to bring the distinctive features of our analysis into sharp relief. Allowing for
private information would introduce an additional transaction cost in the form of a renegotiation
friction. Unlike the transfer costs that we have emphasized, private information in bargaining
is not specic to the international setting which is our focus (though surely important in real-
world trade agreements), so we feel justied in abstracting from this type of friction in our
basic model. In our extended model of section 4.1 we have introduced a cost of renegotiation,
which captures a form of renegotiation frictions in a simple and tractable way. Still, extending
our results to settings with private information would likely yield additional insights.
In our model, contracts between governments can be perfectly enforced. This is a strong as-
sumption, since in reality trade agreements must be self-enforcing, but issues of self-enforcement
are logically distinct from the choice between property and liability rules (on this logical dis-
tinction see Jackson, 1997, p. 63, and see also Pauwelyn, 2008, pp. 148-197, for an especially
detailed discussion of this point), so focusing on a model with enforceable contracts seems to
us like a reasonable rst step.43 But saying that these issues are logically distinct does not
mean that there is no interaction between them: indeed, our paper leaves open some subtle
43For papers that model the self-enforcing nature of trade agreements, see for example Bagwell and Staiger
(1990), Maggi (1999) and Ederington (2001) in addition to those mentioned in the Introduction.
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questions about the interplay between the nature of enforcement mechanisms and the nature
of legal rules. We see this interplay as an important topic for future research.
Finally, we have focused on a two-country model. We believe that this is a natural rst step
to understand the implications of renegotiation for trade agreements, and that such a setting
captures some of the fundamental forces governing the tradeo¤ between property rules and
liability rules. Nevertheless, it is important to assess the robustness of our results to a multi-
country setting. To make some progress in this direction, we have analyzed a three-country
version of our model, where country H can import a good from two exporting countries, say
F1 and F2. The presence of competing exporters can in principle a¤ect results, especially if
trade barriers are constrained to be non-discriminatory (i.e. satisfy the most-favored-nation
(MFN) restriction) because in this case, when renegotiating the agreement, the importer must
secure the consensus of both exporters in order to change its trade policy, so renegotiation is
intrinsically a multilateral bargaining process. However, we nd that our qualitative results
extend to this setting with little modication. More specically, we assume that the importer
can choose a single trade policy (P or FT ) for both exporters.44 Exporters can su¤er di¤erent
levels of harm from protection and can have di¤erent bargaining powers. We also assume that
the deadweight cost of transfers takes the form C = c(b1) + c(b2), where bi is the transfer from
the importer to exporter i. In this setting, a contract species a level of damages for each
exporter, (bD1 ; b
D




2 ) is prohibitive or if
bD1 = b
D
2 = 0, and as a liability rule otherwise.
In the three-country setting just described, we can show that our Propositions 1-5 continue
to hold, provided some regularity conditions are satised.45 The only interesting di¤erence that
arises compared with our basic model is that, when the contract is renegotiated (toward free
trade), it may happen that one of the exporters compensates the importer (bei < 0) while the
other is compensated by the importer (bej > 0). But at least under the regularity conditions
mentioned in note 45, this does not a¤ect our results.46
44In this way we are imposing the MFN restriction exogenously. In principle this restriction should be derived
endogenously as an optimal rule, and in a complete analysis of the multi-country setting this would be an
important objective; but explaining the MFN rule is not the focus of our model, so the interpretation of the
exercise we undertake here is that we are optimizing the agreement rules conditional on the MFN restriction.
45In particular, we can prove our results if the function c(b) is not too asymmetric around b = 0. Alternatively,
we can prove the results for a general c(b) if the exporting countries are not too asymmetric.
46The competing exporterssetting we describe above is not the only multi-country setting that one could
consider. A natural alternative would be that of competing importers: for example, a model where a given
country exports a good to multiple importers, along the lines of an Armington model. However, the competing-
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One may argue that in a multilateral setting, renegotiation frictions (which in our model
are captured by the parameter K) are likely to be quite di¤erent than in a bilateral setting.
But note that this does not a¤ect our qualitative results, because they hold the number of
countries xed (two in our basic model, three in the multilateral extension) and examine the
impact of changes in other parameters, for example the degree of uncertainty. Having said this,
there is a separate and interesting question that arises in a multi-country setting: How does
an expansion of the agreement membership a¤ect the tradeo¤ between property and liability
rules? Some scholars have argued that, if trade policies are constrained to be nondiscriminatory,
renegotiation frictions are likely to become more severe as the number of member countries
expands, because in case of renegotiation each individual exporter may attempt to hold up the
bargain in order to extract rents. This consideration, together with the standard result from
the law-and-economics literature that higher renegotiation frictions tend to favor a liability-
rule approach, have led these scholars to conclude that the expansion of WTO membership
should make a liability-rule approach more attractive.47 In our model, renegotiation frictions
(K) are a black box, so the model is not designed to investigate how these frictions may vary
with the number of countries involved; but it is interesting to observe that, if one accepts
the premise that renegotiation frictions increase with the number of member countries, our
model then leads to the opposite conclusion: as we have emphasized, in the presence of costly
transfers it is property rules rather than liability rules that are more likely to be optimal when
renegotiation frictions are higher. This in turn suggests an intriguing possibility: the expansion
of the GATT/WTO membership may have been a contributing factor in causing the shift from
a liability-rule approach to a property-rule approach, which according to many legal scholars
has taken place over time. We leave a more formal and complete exploration of this and other
extensions to future work.
importers setting is conceptually more straightforward, because the renegotiation of a trade policy is then a
bilateral bargain between the relevant importer and the exporting country, and hence the analysis would be
similar to that of our basic model. The main di¤erence would be that the joint gains from protection for a
given exporter-importer pair will depend on the trade policies chosen by the other importers. The results of our
basic model should apply to a given exporter-importer pair conditional on the other importerspolicies, and
therefore should apply conditional on the other importersequilibrium policies as well. Based on this intuition,
we conjecture that our main insights would survive also in this alternative multi-country scenario.
47On this point, see Schwartz and Sykes (2002) and Pauwelyn (2008, pp. 56-59).
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7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5: Let b^D denote the level of bD for which the S(bD) curve intersects
the R(bD;K) curve, and ~bD the level of bD for which the S(bD) curve intersects the horizontal
line  = S( + (1  )K) + K, as in Figure 4.
The rst step is to establish that, as in the case of costless renegotiation, under an optimal
contract there can never be renegotiation from FT to P . With reference to Figure 4, this can
be easily established by arguing that it is never optimal to set bD > ~bD.
The second step is to argue that, for any K, if a property rule is optimal it is never renegoti-
ated. This step implies that, conditional on a property rule being optimal, a change in K does
not a¤ect the performance of that property rule. Consider rst the discretionary property rule
bD = 0: if the contract is renegotiated for some , then an analogous argument as in the case
of costless renegotiation establishes that joint surplus can be increased by raising bD slightly
above zero. Consider next a prohibitive property rule bD  bprohib: by denition this implies
that the importers threat point is FT for all  in the support; and we know from the argument
just above that under an optimal contract there can never be renegotiation from FT to P .
The third step is to argue that an increase inK weakly worsens the performance of a liability
rule. We need to distinguish between two cases: at the initial level of K the contract may or
may not be renegotiated for some , depending on whether bD is higher or lower than b^D. If
b^D < bD < bprohib, a marginal increase in K will have no e¤ect. If 0 < bD < b^D, a marginal
increase in K will lower the expected joint payo¤, as we now show.
Let us x a value of bD in (0; b^D), and consider the e¤ect of a marginal increase in K. We
can write the expected joint payo¤ as
E
 = V (FT ) +
1Z
R(bD;K)




where the notation be(bD; ;K) highlights the dependence of the renegotiated transfer be on K.
It is clear from the expression above that a marginal increase in K has three e¤ects. First,
it decreases R(), the level of  for which governments are indi¤erent between renegotiating and
not; however this is a second-order e¤ect, because (a) the probability distribution is atomless,
and (b) as in the costless-renegotiation case, (it can easily be shown that) 
 is continuous at
 = R(). Second, for  in the renegotiation interval (S(); R()), it has a direct negative e¤ect,
35
since it is a deadweight cost. And third, for  2 (S(); R()), it has an indirect e¤ect through be
We now argue that this indirect e¤ect may be positive or negative, but it can never outweigh
the direct negative e¤ect.
Recall that, when bD and  are in the relevant renegotiation region (FTR), the joint payo¤
in this region is       c(be)   K. We will show that any indirect e¤ect of the increase in
K through be cannot outweigh its direct negative e¤ect. Note that this indirect e¤ect may be
positive or negative, and it is more likely to be positive when  is low, so that the exporting
country bears a large share of the cost. To see this intuitively, recall rst that in the FTR
region the exporting government makes a transfer to the importing government (be < 0). If the
exporter bears most of the renegotiation cost, the transfer be will need to go down (in absolute
value), in order to satisfy the exporters individual-rationality constraint, and this is benecial
to joint surplus because it reduces the deadweight loss. However we now argue that even if the
indirect e¤ect is positive, it cannot outweigh the direct negative e¤ect.
Focusing on the FTR region, Homes surplus over its disagreement utility is S(bD)  S(b) 
   K, and Foreigns surplus is  + b   bD   (1   )K. The renegotiated transfer be is the
value of b that maximizes the Nash product
NB(b; bD) = [S(bD)  S(b)     K]  [ + b  bD   (1  )K]1 
Recalling that c0(b) >  1 for all b by assumption, it su¢ ces to show that @be
@K
< 1.
It is convenient to work with the logarithm of NB, which is legitimate provided that  is
strictly between zero and one, so that each government gets a strictly positive surplus (S(bD) 
S(b)   K > 0 and + b  bD  (1 )K > 0). The extension of the proof to the extreme
cases  = 0 and  = 1 is straightforward.














S(bD)  S(b)     K +
1  





[S(bD)  S(b)     K]2 +
(1  )(1  )





S(bD)  S(b)     K  
S 0(b)2
[S(bD)  S(b)     K]2  
1  




< 0, ensuring that the SOC is satised. Next note that if  is su¢ ciently
36
close to zero @
2 lnNB
@b@K
is positive, and hence @b
e
@K
> 0, consistently with the intuitive discussion
above.





[ + b  bD   (1  )K]2 :
Moreover, recalling that S 00(b) > 0 and noting that the importers surplus from the renegotiation












for all b, and hence @b
e
@K
< 1, as claimed.
We have established that an increase in K weakly worsens the performance of a liability
rule, and does not a¤ect the performance of an optimal property rule. The claim of Proposition
5 can then be proved as follows. Suppose that at the initial level of K the optimum is a
property rule; then an increase in K will make a liability rule (weakly) less attractive than the
optimal property rule, hence the optimum will still be a property rule. It remains to argue
that, if at the initial level of K the optimum is a liability rule, an increase in K may cause
a switch to a property rule. This can be established by example. Consider changing K from
a prohibitive level (such that renegotiation never occurs) to zero, and focus on a case where
uncertainty is large but without renegotiation a discretionary property rule is optimal, along
the lines described in section 3. In this case, a liability rule must become optimal as K is
dropped to zero, as indicated by Proposition 2. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
In this extended family of contracts, we can think of a pair (bD; bFT ) as representing a
contract. For each contract and state of the world, (bD; bFT ; ), there will be one of four possible
equilibrium outcomes: (i) the importer chooses P without renegotiating; (ii) the importers
threat point is P but the governments renegotiate to policy FT ; (iii) the importer chooses FT
without renegotiating; (iv) the importers threat point is FT but the governments renegotiate
to policy P . The rst step of the analysis is to characterize the mapping from (bD; bFT ; ) to
these four possible outcomes. One way to proceed is to build on the graphical apparatus of
Figure 1: we continue working within the (bD; ) space and think of bFT as a parameter that
shifts the key curves in this space.
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As we will show later, it can never be optimal to set bFT > 0 or bD < 0. Since proving this
claim involves a tedious and taxonomic argument, we postpone this argument to a later part
of this proof, and here we focus on the intuitive case where bFT  0 and bD  0.
Let us start by characterizing the locus of points where the importer is indi¤erent between
the two threat points (P and FT ), for a given bFT . Clearly, the importer is indi¤erent between
the two threat points when  = S(bD) S(bFT ). This threat-point-indi¤erence curve is depicted
in Figure 4. Note that introducing bFT < 0 in the contract shifts the threat-point-indi¤erence
curve upwards relative to Figure 1.
Next we ask: given bFT , what are the regions of the (bD; ) space in which governments
renegotiate the contract? Let us rst derive the region in which the threat point is P but
governments renegotiate toward FT (which we continue to label FTR). It is immediate to
verify that the threat point is P i¤  > S(bD)  S(bFT ), and that in this case governments will
renegotiate to FT i¤  < S(bD)   S(bD   ) = R(bD). Notice that this latter condition is
exactly the same as in the case of bD-only contracts. Intuitively, conditional on the threat point
being P the level of bFT does not a¤ect the outcome. The R(bD) curve is depicted in Figure
4, and is the same as the R(bD) curve in Figure 1. Thus, the region FTR is the region above
the  = S(bD)  S(bFT ) curve and below the R(bD) curve. Note for future reference that these
curves intersect for bD =  + bFT , and note also that if bFT is su¢ ciently large and negative
the FTR region will be empty. In Figure 4 we depict the case in which the FTR region overlaps
with the positive quadrant, which (as we show below) must be the case at an optimal contract.
We next characterize the region where the threat point is FT but governments renegotiate
toward P (which we continue to label PR). Clearly the threat point is FT i¤  < S(bD)  
S(bFT ), and it is easy to show that in this case governments will renegotiate toward P i¤
 < S(bFT + )  S(bFT ). It can be easily veried that  = S(bFT + )  S(bFT ) is just the
horizontal line that goes through the point of intersection between the  = S(bD)   S(bFT )
curve and the R(bD) curve. The PR region is therefore the region that lies above this horizontal
line and below the  = S(bD)  S(bFT ) curve, as depicted in Figure 4.
Having characterized the mapping from (bD; bFT ; ) to the four possible outcomes, we can
now turn to the characterization of the optimal contract.
We start by extending the result of Proposition 1, which is an intermediate step toward
proving Proposition 6. We argue that it can never be strictly optimal to set bD > + bFT , and
the optimal contract never induces renegotiation toward P , while it does induce renegotiation
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toward FT for an intermediate range of .
We will suppose by contradiction that it is strictly optimal to set bD >  + bFT and will
show that the initial contract can be (weakly) improved upon. We can write the expected joint
surplus as
E
(bD; bFT )jbD+bFT = V (FT ) +
1Z
S(bD) S(bFT )








where (with a slight abuse of notation) be(bFT ; ) denotes the equilibrium transfer in region
PR; note that be depends only on bFT and not on bD. To understand this expression, refer
to Figure 4 and notice that if bD >  + bFT there are three relevant intervals of : for
 > S(bD)   S(bFT ), we are in region P and the joint surplus is V (FT ) +       c(bD); for
S(bFT + )   S(bFT ) <  < S(bD)   S(bFT ), we are in region PR and the joint surplus is
V (FT ) +       c(be(bFT ; )); and for  < S(bFT + )   S(bFT ) we are in region FT and
hence the joint surplus is V (FT )  c(bFT ).




















dH()  c0(bFT )H(S(bFT + )  S(bFT ))
where we have used the fact that 
 is continuous at the border between the FT region and the
PR region (i.e. at  = S(bFT + )  S(bFT )).
We also note for future reference that, in analogy with the result of Lemma 2, one can show
that be(bFT ; ) is increasing in bFT ; intuitively, a higher bFT worsens the threat point for the
importer and hence the importer gets a worse deal in the renegotiation. Finally, recall that in
the PR region  + bFT < be < S 1( + S(bFT )).
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There are two cases to consider, depending on whether bD > 0 or bD = 0.
Suppose rst that bD > 0 at the initial contract. In this case we can improve over the
initial contract by lowering bD to maxf0;  + bFTg. From expression 7.1 it is clear that this
will increase E
, because it induces no change in the policy and (i) for states  that lie above
S(bD)   S(bFT ) before and after the change, the transfer bD is reduced, and (ii) for states 
that lie below S(bD)   S(bFT ) before the change but above S(bD)   S(bFT ) after the change,
the transfer goes from be to bD, which is an improvement since be >  + bFT .
Next suppose bD = 0 at the initial contract. In this case the initial contract can be dominated
by increasing bFT slightly toward zero. To see this, notice that (i) since we have supposed that
bD   + bFT , we have bFT < 0 and hence c0(bFT ) < 0; and (ii) given bD = 0, in region
PR we have  <  S(bFT ), and hence be < S 1( + S(bFT )) < 0, and recalling that be is
increasing in bFT , this in turn implies dc(b
e(bFT ;))
dbFT





bD+bFT > 0 when evaluated at b
D = 0.
To summarize, we have just shown that the result of Proposition 1 extends to this more
general class of contracts, in the sense that we can focus without loss of generality on contracts
with bD <  + bFT , and the optimal contract never induces renegotiation toward P , while it
does induce renegotiation toward FT for an intermediate range of .
We can now turn to proving the claims made in Proposition 6. It is convenient to start with
the case of large uncertainty (Proposition 6(ii)).
Large uncertainty.
For our purposes it su¢ ces to focus on the case of full support, i.e.  2 (0;1). Recall that
we are focusing on the case where bD  0 and bFT  0 (we show later that it can never be
optimal to set bD < 0 or bFT > 0).
Let ~bD denote the optimal value of bD conditional on bFT = 0. Given our results above
and our focus on bD  0, it follows that 0  ~bD  . We now argue that, starting from
(bFT = 0; bD = ~bD), we can raise expected joint surplus by making bFT slightly negative.
Decreasing bFT slightly has no impact on the policy allocation, but it has two e¤ects on the
expected equilibrium transfer. First, for  < S(bD) there is now a small transfer bFT , which
introduces a cost, but this is a second order cost since c0(0) = 0. Second, for  just above
 = S(bD) the threat point switches from P to FT, so for these states, before the change
governments renegotiate toward FT and the equilibrium transfer is nonnegligible, and after the
change the importer chooses FT without renegotiating and the transfer is negligible (because
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bFT is close to zero); this is a rst-order benecial e¤ect. Note that, within the renegotiation
region FTR, decreasing bFT has no impact on the threat point, hence it does not a¤ect the
equilibrium transfer.
To see this more formally, let us write down the expected joint surplus as a function of bD
and bFT . As we argued above we can focus on the case bD   + bFT . We can then write the
expected joint surplus as
E
(bD; bFT )jbD+bFT = V (FT ) +
1Z
R(bD)















=  h(S(~bD))c(be(~bD;S(~bD))) < 0
where we have used the facts that S(bFT ) = bFT + c(bFT ) and c(0) = c0(0) = 0; it can easily
be shown that be(~bD;S(~bD)) 6= 0; and recall that we are assuming a large enough support of ,
hence h(S(~bD)) > 0. We can conclude that, when the support of  is large enough, bFT = 0
cannot be optimal, and coupled with the fact that the optimal bFT cannot be positive (as we
next argue), this implies that the optimal bFT is strictly negative.
We now rule out the possibility that bD = 0 at an optimal contract. Given our results above,
the only case we need to rule out is bD = 0   + bFT . Letting ~bFT denote the optimal value











dH() + h( S(~bFT ))[c(be(0; S(~bFT ))  c(~bFT )]
In this case it is immediate to establish that in the FTR region be  S 1( ) < 0. It follows
that at the lower border of the FTR region, where  =  S(~bFT ), it must be be  ~bFT  0. This
implies c(be(0; S(~bFT ))  c(~bFT ), so the second term of the expression above is nonnegative.
Also recall that @b
e(bD;)
@bD
> 0, hence dc(b
e(bD;))
dbD






and hence bD = 0 cannot be optimal. This, together with the fact that the optimal bD cannot
be negative (as we argue below), implies that the optimal bD is strictly positive.
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We now return to our earlier claim that it cannot be optimal to set bD < 0 or bFT > 0
(recall that we just ruled out the possibilities bD = 0 and bFT = 0, so we can focus on strict
inequalities). To establish this claim, we need to rule out several possibilities:
(a) bD < 0 and bFT < 0. We need to distinguish two subcases:
(ai) bD  + bFT . In this case it is easy to show that the equilibrium transfer be in the
renegotiation region (PR) is negative. Our strategy to improve on the initial contract depends
on whether bD is higher or lower than be at the initial contract. If bD < be, we can improve on
the initial contract by increasing bD slightly; to see this, refer to expression 7.1 and note that




bD+bFT > 0. If b
D > be, then we can




bD+bFT > 0; to see
this, note that in this case c(bD)   c(be) < 0, c0(bFT ) < 0 and dc(be(bFT ;))
dbFT
< 0 (and recall the
assumption that 1 + c0() > 0 for any transfer level).
(aii) bD <  + bFT . Also in this case the equilibrium transfer be in the renegotiation
region (FTR) is negative. Our strategy to improve on the initial contract depends on whether
bFT is higher or lower than be in absolute level. If jbej > jbFT j, we can improve on the initial
contract by increasing bD slightly toward zero. This has three rst-order benecial e¤ects: (i)
it reduces the transfer (in absolute value) for states  > R(bD), where the importer chooses P
without renegotiating; (ii) it improves the threat point for the importer in the FTR region and
hence it makes be less negative; (iii) for states just above  = S(bD) S(bFT ), before the change
governments renegotiate toward FT and after the change the importer chooses FT without
renegotiating, thus the equilibrium transfer switches from be to bFT ; since we are focusing on
the case jbej > jbFT j, also this e¤ect is benecial.
If jbej < jbFT j, on the other hand, we can improve on the initial contract by increasing
bFT slightly toward zero. This has two benecial rst-order e¤ects: (i) it reduces the transfer
(in absolute value) for states  < S(bD)   S(bFT ), where the importer chooses FT without
renegotiating, and (ii) for states just above  = S(bD)   S(bFT ), the equilibrium transfer
switches from bFT to be; since we are focusing on the case jbej < jbFT j, this e¤ect is benecial.
(b) bD < 0 and bFT > 0.
It can be easily shown that we can lower bFT to zero, and in fact we can make it slightly
negative, without a¤ecting the policy allocation or the equilibrium transfer for any . This
takes us back to the previous case where bD < 0 and bFT < 0, which we already ruled out.
(c) bD > 0 and bFT > 0. Here our strategy to improve on the initial contract depends on
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whether bD is higher or lower than . If bD < , we can improve on the initial contract by
increasing bFT to zero. And if bD < , the initial contract can be improved upon by increasing
both bD and bFT toward zero in such a way that S(bD) S(bFT ) is kept constant. We leave the
proof of these claims to the reader.
Finally, the claim that an optimal contract entails bD <  follows from the fact that an
optimal contract entails bD <  + bFT and bFT < 0.
Small uncertainty.
We can now turn to the case of small uncertainty (Proposition 6(i)).
The rst observation is that a noncontingent allocation (where the same policy is chosen
for all  in the support) can be implemented at zero cost (i.e. with no transfers occurring
in equilibrium) with a property rule. Thus, conditional on a noncontingent allocation being
optimal, a property rule is optimal. We next show that if the support of  is su¢ ciently small,
a noncontingent allocation is indeed optimal.
Let the support of  be given by (   ";  + "); note that we are considering a symmetric
support, but the argument is easily extended to the case of an asymmetric support. Consider
a contingent allocation with threshold ^"2 (   ";  + ") (we use the subscript " because we
need to allow this allocation to vary as we drive " to zero). We have shown above that at an
optimum it must be the case that for  = ^" the importer is indi¤erent between choosing P
without renegotiating and renegotiating toward FT. In other words, it must be ^" = R(b
D) =
S(bD) S(bD ): This implies that for states  just above ^" the importer will pay a transfer
bD that is close to R 1(^"); clearly, this transfer does not become small as " gores to zero.
For states  just below ^" the governments will renegotiate and the equilibrium transfer may
be lower, but this transfer is unrelated to " and hence does not become small as the support
shrinks.
Now consider replacing this contingent allocation with a noncontingent allocation where
policy FT is chosen in all states (and no transfers are incurred). As "! 0 this noncontingent
allocation must dominate, because it implies a non-negligible savings in transfer costs for each
state , while the associated loss in terms of policy e¢ ciency is at most of magnitude " for
each state . Note that this argument holds even if the threshold ^ approaches one of the
bounds of the support as " ! 0. We have thus shown that if the support is su¢ ciently small,
a noncontingent allocation must be optimal, and therefore a property rule is optimal. QED
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